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How to determine what set of genetically diverse or-
ganisms shouldbe conserved is oneof themost chal-
lenging issues of our time. However, this needs to be
analyzed as part of a broader problem. Given that
collections of organisms (e.g., species, subspecies,
and varieties of these) can be retained, added to, and
subtracted from (often as a result of human activi-
ties, including genetic engineering),1,2 the broader
problem is to determine the optimal time-path that
genetic diversity (or biodiversitymore broadly spec-
ified) should follow given the controlled variables
available to humankind. If this problem cannot be
precisely solved (as is probable given the bounded
rationality of human beings3), it may still be possi-
ble to avoid biodiversity paths that are demonstrably
inferior to alternative paths given agreed criteria for
choice of biodiversity.2,4 The presence of bounded
rationality does not render it impossible to make
any rational decisions but it limits the scope for op-
timization.
Important issues for biodiversity conservation (a
term that should really be interpreted in the wide
manner indicated below) include the impact of hu-
man institutions, such as market systems, on bio-
diversity conservation and the consequences of hu-
man desires for the conservation of ecological al-
ternatives. The following matters will be discussed
in turn in this paper: the concept of biodiversity
and its general relevance to human well-being; the
valuation of biodiversity conservation, market, and
institutional failures, particularly in relation to agri-
cultural biodiversity; implications of the rate of in-
terest forbiodiversity conservation; and issues raised
by intergenerational equity and sustainable devel-
opment. Given the restricted space available, only
limited coverage of these topics is possible. The
breadth of biodiversity economics can be gauged
from a recent book edited by Kontoleon, Pascual,
andSwanson entitledBiodiversity Economics: Princi-
ples, Methods and Applications.5 Although this book
is 664 pages in length, it by no means exhausts the
coverage of this subject.
The concept of biodiversity and its
relevance to human well-being
The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment6 states that
biodiversity is “the variability among living from
all sources, including terrestrial, marine, and other
aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of
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which they are part; this includes diversity within
species, between species, and of ecosystems” (p. 16).
Because of the multidimensional nature of biodi-
versity, no single measure of its extent specifies it
fully. Although the Millennium Ecosystem Assess-
ment points out that biodiversity is important in
both unmanaged and managed ecosystems (the lat-
ter, e.g., includes agriculture, aquaculture, and silvi-
culture), it gives greatest attention to unmanaged
systems, probably a disproportionate amount of
emphasis.
The economics of biodiversity conservation is
complex and subject to considerable uncertainty
for several reasons. First, the functioning of ecosys-
tems is complex and often results in ecological
surprises.6 Second, the relevant time period for as-
sessment tends to be so long that many socioeco-
nomic variables relevant to the assessment of biodi-
versity conservation can alter unpredictably. Third,
human conflict about how biodiversity should be
valued and differences in opinion about its antici-
pated trajectory add to the difficulty involved in for-
mulating socially acceptable policies for biodiversity
conservation.
All aspects of the economics of biodiversity con-
servation cannot be covered in this paper. Its main
focus is on genetic conservation and its signif-
icance for human well-being. Nevertheless, it is
clear that the persistence of genetic diversity de-
pends on the maintenance of diverse life-support
systems (ecosystems) and that these systems them-
selves have economic values. These values eventu-
ate because ecosystems generate ecological services;
many of which fail to be priced or are underpriced
in economic systems. Consequently, they are li-
able to be undervalued by society and inadequately
conserved.
Ecologists have considered the following prob-
lem: if not all diverse ecosystems, landscapes, and
biomes can be conserved, which ones should be
given priority? For example, Myers et al.7 identi-
fied biodiversity hotspots that on the basis of en-
demism and threats, should in their view be given
priority for conservation, and this has triggered de-
bate among ecologists.8–10 However, in this debate,
the economic benefits and costs of conserving such
biological assemblages has not been made the spe-
cific basis for establishing these priorities despite
some references to economic considerations.7 Al-
though Balmford et al. bring attention to this issue
and argue that biological and economic information
shouldbe combined to establishpriorities for nature
conservation, their attempt to do this11 is, at best,
exploratory.
Advances in economic thought (e.g., the theory
of externalities, given impetus initially by Pigou,12
and the theory of public goods outlined by Samuel-
son13) paved the way for appreciation of the eco-
nomic value of the services provided by biodiversity,
many of which are unpriced or inadequately priced
inmarket systems.Furthermore, thedevelopmentof
the concept of total economic value comprising use
and nonuse values further extended the breadth of
economic valuation. This led to the recognition that
individuals value the continuing existence of some
species, ecosystems, or other environmental features
even if they do not intend to make direct use of
these. Although such advances in economic thought
have improved processes of economic valuation of
biodiversity, it is also necessary to be aware of the
continuing limitations of economic approaches to
valuingbiodiversity. These valuations are influenced
by cosmological and normative premises, and their
empirical limitations are often overlooked.
Limitations of economic valuations
of biodiversity
There are several different possible economic ap-
proaches to valuing biodiversity. One mainstream
approach relies heavily on the view thatwhat citizens
desire should be the paramount consideration in
valuing biodiversity. This is seen as democratic and
is an extension of the idea that consumers should
be sovereign.Traditionally, economists haveplaceda
heavyweight on the preferences of individuals in de-
termining social choices about resource alternatives.
However, a number of considerations make this ap-
proach to determining a socially optimal path for
biodiversity problematic. For example, social values
alter with the passage of time and they both shape
and are shaped by communal values. Passmore14
shows how Western ethical attitudes to nature have
changed and Myrdal15 stressed the importance of
circular causation in relation to the formation of
social values. Furthermore, attitudes toward nature
often differ between cultures and they also reflect
variations in cosmological views. In addition, so-
cial values probably alter with changes in objective
circumstances; for example, the view that humans
have a duty to conserve all living things may have
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strengthened because biodiversity loss has increased
and has become more apparent.
Even if it is accepted that the preferences of all
citizens about biodiversity should count, the prob-
lem remains of how to derive an acceptable social
ordering from these, as was illustrated by Arrow’s
Social Impossibility Theorem.16 Arrow showed that
it is impossible to derive from individual prefer-
ence orderings, a social ordering that satisfies rea-
sonable axioms. There are also many problems in
eliciting individual preferences for the conservation
of biodiversity, not least of which are the knowledge
constraints of individuals about alternative possible
states of biodiversity.4 While one would like indi-
viduals to express their preferences in a situation
in which they are fully informed, at best, they can
only be partially informed because of their limited
capacities for comprehending, storing, and process-
ing information.17,18
The supply of information to individuals about
species or natural systems to be evaluated usually
causes their stated preferences for supporting the
survival or conservation of those species or systems
to alter.19,20 In addition, sensual experiences can al-
ter stated preferences for the conservation of a par-
ticular species.21 But the stated preferences elicited
from individuals are unlikely to remain constant. If
the initial stimuli are not reinforced, their impact on
valuation weakens so that, for example, willingness
to pay for the survival of a species (or accept com-
pensation for its loss) falls, even though nomaterial
changes occur other than the passing of time.22
Furthermore, a Heisenberg-like effect23 (that is
similar to Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle in
quantum physics that, due to an observer effect, the
measurement of the position of a particle, such as
an electron, necessarily disturbs itsmomentum, and
vice versa,making it impossible to determine simul-
taneously and exactly its position and momentum)
createsdifficulties for eliciting fromindividuals their
valuation of species and similar natural things. For
instance, stated preferences of individuals for con-
serving species usually vary with the information
conveyed to them and this is by necessity selective.
This is an additional problem to many others that
have been encountered in using stated preference
methods for evaluating environmental and ecologi-
cal possibilities.24 These difficulties include substan-
tial differences in the amounts that individuals are
willing to pay for retention of ecological possibili-
ties and the amount they are willing to accept for the
loss of this same set of ecological possibilities.25,26 In
cases where there is a substantial difference between
these two measures of valuation, it is necessary to
make a moral judgment about which is the most
appropriate criterion.
In addition to stated preference methods, re-
vealed preference techniques, such as the travel cost
method and hedonic pricing, are also used to esti-
mate the economic values of some attributes of bio-
diversity.2 However, these methods do not account
for nonuse values (unlike stated preference meth-
ods) and have other shortcomings. For instance, the
travel cost method does not measure the total eco-
nomic value of a natural area, assumes that visitors
are very well informed about the attributes of such
areas, and has other limitations. Allmajor economic
methods of valuation aim to derive monetary mea-
sures of value based on anthropocentric utilitarian
considerations. This is sowhether they rely on stated
preference, revealed preference or other techniques
to elicit these values.
That raises the question of whether a deon-
tological approach to valuing ecological alterna-
tives is preferable to a utilitarian-type approach.27
These approaches are sometimes irreconcilable—
for example, those with strong ecocentric values
may refuse to accept social choices supported by
those with strong anthropocentric utilitarian val-
ues. However, some individuals (probably most)
may accept a combination of these values, for in-
stance, man-centered utilitarian valuations may be
accepted subject to the fulfillment of various “moral
imperatives” about the treatment of nature. This is
a multicriteria approach to decision making about
biodiversity conservation.
As pointed out by Gatto and De Leo,4 the dom-
inant economic approach to valuing attributes of
biodiversity and ecosystem services is typified by so-
cial cost–benefit. This approach endeavors to mea-
sure values in term of monetary units. It is cer-
tainly true that monetary measures of the value of
the world’s ecosystems and natural resources, such
as those proposed by Costanza et al.,28 are influ-
ential. Nevertheless, it is necessary to be wary of
single monetary measures of the value of biodi-
versity conservation.4,29 Indeed, Pigou,12 who can
be regarded as the founder of modern welfare eco-
nomics, emphasized thatmonetary-basedeconomic
values, such as those generatedby social cost–benefit
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analysis, should be just one input into the process of
social decision making. It is instructive and useful
to consider the value of biodiversity conservation
from different angles before making a social deci-
sion about it. One should not rely solely on eco-
nomic measures even though they are an important
consideration. To some extent the prevailing heavy
emphasis of proponents of biodiversity conserva-
tion on its economic benefits is based on perceived
political necessity of this emphasis. As Sachs et al.30
point out, “efforts to maintain biodiversity must be
sensitive to human needs if they are to retain pub-
lic support” (p. 1502). However, scholarly enquiry
should not be driven purely by this consideration.
The Noah’s Ark problem
The Noah’s Ark problem can be used to illustrate
several important social choice issues in biodiver-
sity conservation, especially if it is combined with
the assumption that the ark has limited capacity
and, therefore, only some species can be saved and
the remainder must perish. This problem focuses
attention on the need to decide on the ecological al-
ternative to be conserved and to determine the other
alternatives that must be forgone.
It has been contended by some social scien-
tists31,32 that if human preferences are used to de-
termine which species will be saved, preference will
be given to saving species that show greater simi-
larity in appearance to human beings than others
or which have similar biological characteristics to
humans. Thus, species of mammals are likely to be
preferred tobird species, bird species arepreferred to
reptile species, and so on. Tisdell et al.33 found em-
pirical support for the similarity principle based on
whether or not a sample of respondents favored the
survival of each species in a group of 24 Australian
species of mammals, birds, and reptiles. However, it
was also found that among the set of reptiles, tur-
tle species were so highly liked and supported for
survival that the similarity principle was not fully
satisfied. A dichotomy existed in the likeability of
different reptile species and in public’s support for
their survival.
The above-mentioned type of research aims to
determinehow individuals evaluatedifferent species
based on the characteristics of the species. However,
the humanoid similarity of species is not the only
attribute influencing such evaluation. For example,
Metrick and Weitzman34,35 found that the size of
the adults of a species and their perceived danger to
humans (visceral factors) are also influences on the
likeability of species.
This raises the questiononce again of the extent to
which individual preferences of this nature should
be respected in social decision making. Deontolo-
gists with an ecocentric bent would most likely not
accept social decision making based solely on indi-
vidual preferences as a guide to biodiversity conser-
vation because it fails to give due weight to moral
imperatives, such as humankind’s duty to steward
nature. In reality, mixed ethical systems seem to ex-
ist in many societies. For example, individual pref-
erences may be respected in social decision making
provided that they do not conflict with basic moral
principles encapsulated in social values.
Apart from this moral perspective, respect for
individual preferences as a basis for decisions about
biodiversity conservation needs to be tempered by
the extent towhich individuals are rational andwell-
informed about alternative ecological possibilities
and their consequences.4
Although formulations of the Noah’s Ark prob-
lem are far from perfect in capturing the basic bio-
diversity choices facing humankind, they highlight
the need for tradeoffs in the survival of species (the
likelihood that some can continue to exist but not
others) and tradeoffs needed in sustaining other
features of biodiversity. Many economic studies in-
tended to estimate the contingent valuation of in-
dividual species or selected features of biodiversity
fail to take adequate account of such tradeoffs. Fur-
thermore, it should be noted that willingness of in-
dividuals to contribute to or pay for the conserva-
tion of a particular species or a natural ecosystem
usually differs from their willingness to support its
survival.20 This is because the willingness of in-
dividuals to contribute to the conservation of a
species (or some other feature of the natural world)
partly depends on the extent to which its existence
is threatened. For example, Tisdell et al.20 found
strong support in Australia for the survival of the
red kangaroo but a reluctance to contribute funds
for its conservation, because it is abundant and not
endangered.
An advantage of considering the constrained
Noah’s Ark problem is that it demonstrates the lim-
itations of some suggested decision making crite-
ria for determining the conservation of biodiver-
sity. In particular, Ciriacy-Wantrup’s suggestion36
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that all species be conserved at a safe minimum
populationmay be unable to be satisfied because the
limited availability of resources makes this impos-
sible.37 Furthermore, Bishop’s qualification38 that
this should be so for each species unless the cost of
achieving it is unacceptably high for some, begs the
question of what is “unacceptably high.” Again, no
completely safe minimum population may exist for
any species.39
Uncertainty, the precautionary principle,
and decisions about biodiversity
conservation
It is widely accepted that the benefits of conserv-
ing individual species and components of biolog-
ical systems are uncertain. It is usually contended
that in these circumstances, it is wise to be cau-
tious in decision making and that it is likely to be
rational to err in favor of conserving biodiversity.
This has been dubbed the precautionary principle
and is put forward, for example, in the Millennium
Ecosystem Assessment6 in support of biodiversity
conservation. However, this matter is much more
complicated than seems to be the case at first sight.
For example, a high preference for security can favor
economicdevelopment and loss of species or ecosys-
temsbecause thebenefits fromthis development can
be more certain than those from the conservation
of particular species and ecosystems.40 This is partly
a reflection of the adage that “a bird in the hand is
worth two in the bush.” The optimal choice does,
however, depend on the particular structure of the
decision problem.
Economists have pointed out that even when risk
neutrality exists, it may be rational to err in favor
of the conservation of species or other components
of ecological systems if there is uncertainty about
the benefits to be had by their conservation.41,42
However, even when risk neutrality exists, the ra-
tionality of precaution depends on the structure
of the possible outcomes, as the following example
shows.
Suppose that the benefits from conserving a
species (or some set or vector of the components
of an ecological system) are uncertain but depend
on the magnitude of a property (or attribute) of it
that is yet to be measured. Assume that while the
magnitude of this property is uncertain now after a
specified period of time, it will become certain. Let
x measure the magnitude of this property and let y
Figure 1. A simple illustration of situations in which uncer-
tainty about the value of a species (or some other component of
biodiversity) favors its conservation in one case but not in an-
other case. Uncertainty does not always favor the conservation
of biodiversity even when there is no risk aversion.
be the benefit from it. Assume that the benefit, y, is
a function of x such that:
y = f (x) and f ′(x)> 0. (1)
Now, as canbededuced fromtheorem90ofHardy
et al.,43 if f (x) is strictly convex (e.g., if f ′′ > 0)
then the expected value of y will tend to rise as the
value of x becomes more uncertain, that is, as its
probability distribution becomes more dispersed. If
probabilities can be assigned to the probable values
of x and its value is uncertain, then
f (E[x]) < E[ f (x)]. (2)
In other words, the uncertainty of benefits from
conserving the species raises its expected benefit
compared to a situation in which its benefit is cer-
tainly E[x]. On the other hand, if the benefit func-
tion f (x) is strictly concave (e.g., f ′′(x) < 0) the
opposite is the case—uncertainty does not favor the
conservation of the species. In the linear case, un-
certainty does not alter the expected benefit from
conserving a species. Note that using the certainty
equivalent E[x] will undervalue the expected bene-
fit of conserving the species if f (x) is strictly convex
and it will overvalue its expected value if f (x) is
concave. Thus, as discussed by Theil,44 the use of
certainty equivalents in optimization problems can
result in suboptimal decisions.
The simple example shown in Figure 1 illustrates
these relationships. There the curve marked ABC
represents a strictly convex situation and curve GH
represents a strictly concave relationship. Envisage a
Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. 1219 (2011) 99–112 c© 2011 New York Academy of Sciences. 103
Economics of biodiversity conservation Tisdell
situation in which a property (attribute) preserved
by a species has a knownmagnitude of x2. Then, the
benefit (see Fig. 1) of conserving the species based
on this attribute is y1 in the convex case and y3 in
the concave case. Compare this with a situation in
which the magnitude of x becomes uncertain but
maintains an expected magnitude of x2. For exam-
ple, suppose that it becomes 0.5 probable that the
magnitude of x is x1 or x3, where x2 is the expected
value of x corresponding to the midpoint between
x1 and x3. In the convex case, uncertainty raises
the expected benefit of conserving the species from
y1 to y2. However, in the concave case, this uncer-
tainty reduces the expected benefit of conserving
the species from y4 to y3. Thus, in this case, the gen-
eralization that increased uncertainty always raises
the expected benefit from conserving a species does
not hold. It is not always likely to be a wise precau-
tion to conserve a species or element of biodiversity
as a result of greater uncertainty, other things being
held constant.Whether it is or is not depends on the
circumstances. Whereas in the convex case, uncer-
tainty favors precaution and conservation of a focal
species (or another component of biodiversity), the
opposite is so in the concave case. The linear case
exhibits neutrality in that regard.
While the above discussion indicates that the pre-
cautionary principle cannot always be rationally
invoked as an argument in favor of biodiversity
conservation, it ignores the significance of the in-
tergenerational benefits frombiodiversity conserva-
tion and problems involved in interpersonal com-
parisons of benefits. Intergenerational equity and
sustainability considerations could provide support
for biodiversity conservation. This will be discussed
later.
Market and other institutional failures,
market extensions, changed production
methods, and globalization
Market failures and other institutional failures, the
extension of markets (the broadening of markets
from local areas to wider geographical areas includ-
ing global extensions), changed production meth-
ods and globalization have all contributed to bio-
diversity loss. Much has been written about how
defective markets may fail to minimize economic
scarcity and add to biodiversity loss and also about
similar losses caused by political and administrative
failures. Factors, such as environmental externali-
ties, public good attributes of ecological systems,
uncertainties, and shortcomings in property rights
regimes, are typically given considerable attention
in relation to market failures.45 Much less atten-
tion seems to have been given in economics to the
extension of markets, changes in production meth-
ods and increased globalization as forces contribut-
ing to biodiversity loss. This is so despite the fact
that biodiversity loss in unmanaged ecosystems as
a result of economic globalization is well recog-
nized.46 Less obvious are the consequences of the
economicprocessesmentionedabove for loss of bio-
diversity in managed ecosystems: arguably the most
important ecosystems for the maintenance of hu-
man well-being. These factors are, however, major
contributors to loss of agricultural biodiversity, and
similar types of losses occur in relation to silvicul-
ture and aquaculture. Themechanisms involved are
varied.
The extension of markets (of which growing eco-
nomic globalization is one manifestation) usually
results in greater specialization in economic pro-
duction as predicted by the law of comparative eco-
nomic advantage.47,48 This may result in industries
or activities reliant on unique local genetic material
disappearing and the subsequent loss of the genetic
material itself. For example, in Ghana as a result
of international economic activity, the growing of
tree crops, such as cocoa, has developed displacing
a local breed of cattle. Market extension has also re-
sulted in many local varieties of crops and breeds of
livestock being replaced by exotic or improved vari-
eties or breeds. This process is facilitated by techno-
logical and trade developments that tend to reduce
the extent to which the production of bioindustries
are tied to locally available resources. For example,
Vietnam’s local breeds of pigs have been replaced,
to a large extent, by exotic strains of pigs. The pro-
ductivity of the improved pig varieties depends on
improved husbandry and food with a high nutri-
tional value. Much of the food is imported. Con-
sequently, pig production is increasingly decoupled
from local environmental and resource conditions.
Modifications of local conditions increases the ex-
tent of global uniformity in the environmental and
resource possibilities faced by bioindustries and re-
sults in greater uniformity of used genetic material.
Genetic material well adapted to natural local con-
ditions is lost. Human management (facilitated by
international trade in agricultural inputs) tends to
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result in increased uniformity in the constructed
niches in which biologically based production oc-
curs. Consequently, less genetic diversity is needed
for bioproduction than otherwise. However, this
loss of genetic diversity is not without potential
economic costs because it reduces future genetic
options that is, flexibility in decision making.
There are, of course, many factors that influence
the extent of agricultural biodiversity loss as has
been pointed out by Smale andDrucker49 in review-
ing the relevant economic literature.However,many
(but not all) of the findings in the literature are con-
sistent with the view that, on the whole, agricultural
biodiversity is reduced bymarket extension (greater
access of farmers to markets) and by changes (such
as technological changes) that reduce the hetero-
geneity of environmental conditions under which
crops grow or in which livestock are husbanded.
This increased environmental homogeneity is due
to human manipulation of agro-environments.
Smale and Drucker49 (p. 631) point out that
the two overriding determinants of crop diversity
on farms are geographical location (a determinant
of access to markets) and on-farm environmental
heterogeneity. Most case studies indicate that on-
farm biodiversity is positively associated with on-
farmenvironmental heterogeneity.However, the ev-
idence from case studies on the impact of access to
markets on the conservationof on-farmbiodiversity
ismixed. Smale andDrucker49 (p. 632) after review-
ing these case studies, conclude the access tomarkets
and other factors associated with economic devel-
opment may not reduce crop biodiversity on farms
in the short-run. Nevertheless, for reasons specified
by Tisdell47 and Polasky et al.,48 global (aggregate)
agricultural biodiversity can be expected to fall with
market widening and economic development in the
long run, other things being held constant, for ex-
ample, without changes in public policies to pro-
mote genetic conservation.
It is also clear that in cases where market exten-
sion leads to increased demand for an open-access
resource (or a resource for which property-rights
regimes are imperfect), this leads to a more rapid
depletion of the resource. In the case of a living re-
source, other things being constant, the likelihood
of it being extinguished increases. The provision of
roads and similar infrastructure in remote regions
accelerates deforestation and consequently, biodi-
versity loss by increasing market access.50 These
effects arise, at least partly, from market failures.
When market failures occur in biodiversity conser-
vation, market extension (including increased glob-
alization) can be expected to accelerate biodiversity
loss as suggested by Alam and Van Quyen.51
Another feature of increased globalization is that
it has increased the rate and extent of spread of
genetic material between regions because humans
have increasingly facilitated this spread. This spread
has sometimes beendeliberate and at other times ac-
cidental. Some of the issues involved are discussed
by Perrings.52 Often it has had negative spillovers
and it has been a force making for the reduction
of biodiversity globally. For example, the introduc-
tion of livestock to Australia by European settlers
has been implicated in the disappearance of some
Australian indigenous species. The introduction of
the cane toad to northern Queensland to control a
beetle pest in sugar cane has turned out to be a bio-
logical disaster because it has spread (and continues
to do so) and poses a threat to the survival of several
Australian native species.
The rate of interest and biodiversity
conservation
In the economics literature, an increased private rate
of interest is usually seen as a deterrent to the conser-
vation of economic resources.53 Two main reasons
are advanced: (1) it reduces the discounted present
value of benefits to be obtained from delaying the
use of the resource, other things constant; and (2)
it increases the likelihood that those owning such
resources can increase their returns by realizing the
current value of the asset and gain by investing the
funds in the capital market given the higher level
of interest. Furthermore, intergenerational equity
suggests that a zero discount of realizable benefits
between generations would be socially appropriate,
as is argued in The Economics of Ecosystems and
Biodiversity: An Interim Report45 and by Ramsey.54
It is instructive to examine these matters closely.
Consider the view that a high rate of interest is
inimical to biodiversity conservation.53 Whether or
not this is so depends on the particular circum-
stances. If the steady-state economic return from
the stock of a unique organism is constant, then
once the rate of interest rises above this constant
level, the incentive to realize the value of the stock
of the organism tends to increase. This is so if it is
assumed that the cost of liquidating (realizing) the
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Figure 2. An illustration of a case in which a higher rate of
interest reduces the likelihood of the loss of a commercially used
species as a consequence of its being replaced by another species.
living asset is constant and that its total realizable
value is constant. The lower is the cost of harvest-
ing the stock of the organism, the more likely is the
stock to be extinguished as the rate of interest rises,
other things held constant. As the rate of interest
rises, it becomesmoreprofitable to realize the capital
value of the standing stock of the unique organism
and invest the funds obtained at the going rate of
interest.
Another mechanism leading to the extinction of
unique organisms in a commercial setting is their re-
placement by organisms that give a higher economic
return. For example, slow growing and less valuable
tree species may be replaced by faster growing and
more valuable ones. In practice, the replacement
species are often exotic to the region where they are
grown. However, the replacement of the species is
not without initial costs. Costs can be expected to
be incurred in the replacement period and income
can be expected to be forgone during the gestation
period before the replacement crop (species) be-
comes commercially productive. These costs create
an economic disincentive to switch to the replace-
ment species. Furthermore, the replacement disin-
centive magnifies as the rate of interest rises, other
things being held constant.
This can be illustrated by a simplified case. This
assumes linear relationships, but if the demand and
supply curves have normal slopes the same conse-
quences follow. In Figure 2, line ABCD represents
the net income flow from using a unique species,
other things being held constant. Suppose that at
time t1 it becomes apparent that this species couldbe
replaced by another giving a higher net income flow
after the replacement species is established. How-
ever, initial costs must be incurred to achieve the
adjustment and consequently, if the replacement is
undertaken at t1, the net income path is assumed
to become EFGH, where t3 is assumed to be the
time horizon for this decision problem. If the rate
of interest is zero (and no discounting occurs), it is
profitable to switch to the new species if the area of
rectangle GCDH exceeds that of BEFC and not to
do this if the opposite relationship prevails. If both
these areas are equal, then either of the alternative
strategies is equally profitable. However, if in this
case, a positive interest rate prevails, replacement of
the existing species is no longer profitable because
the discounted value of the income flow in the area
of rectangle GCDH will be less than that in the area
of rectangle BEFC. In general, a higher rate of in-
terest will be a deterrent to the replacement of the
existing species by another in a situation like this.
Therefore, in cases like this, a higher rate of interest
is a deterrent to biodiversity loss, unlike in the pre-
vious case. Note also that the longer is the gestation
period, t2 – t1, and greater is the reduction in in-
come in this period, the lower is the economic incen-
tive to replace the existing species by the substitute
species.
The above theory is based on partial microeco-
nomic analysis. Consideration of macroeconomic
analysis also confirms that there is no simple reg-
ular relationship between the rate of interest and
the likely extent of biodiversity loss.55 Aggregate in-
vestment in man-made capital usually involves the
transformation or depletion of natural capital and
is a major source of biodiversity loss.56–60 Depend-
ing on the macroeconomic circumstances, the level
of investment in man-made capital can increase or
decrease when the rate of interest rises.61 For exam-
ple, suppose that in the neoclassical case illustrated
in Figure 3 the demand for funds for investment is
initially as shown by the line D1D1 and the supply
of these are as indicated by S1S1. Market equilib-
rium occurs at E1 with the rate of interest being r1.
The level of investment is equal to X1. If the supply
curve of savings (loanable funds) shifts up to S2S2
and the demand for investible funds remains un-
changed, market equilibrium alters from E1 to E2.
The rate of interest increases from r1 to r2 and the
level of investment declines from X1 to X0. Given
that the aggregate level of investment is positively
associated with the rate of biodiversity loss, the rate
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Figure 3. In a microeconomic setting, a rise in the rate of
interestmay be accompanied by either a rise or fall in the level of
investment, as is illustrated above. Consequently, if biodiversity
loss is positively associated with the level of investment, a rise
in the rate of interest can be associated with an increase or with
a fall in the rate of biodiversity loss, and vice versa.
of biodiversity loss declines. On the other hand, if
the supply curve of loanable funds remains unal-
tered and the demand curve for the funds shifts up-
ward, the rate of interest rises and so does the level of
investment. For example, if the demand curve shifts
up to D2D2 market equilibrium alters from E1to E3,
the rate of interest goes up to r2, and investment in-
creases from X1 to X2. Thus, if increased investment
in man-made capital poses a heightened threat to
biodiversity conservation, biodiversity loss tends to
rise. Therefore, one cannot judge just from the sign
of variation in the rate of interest whether there is
an increase or decrease in biodiversity loss. Similar
results hold for IS-LM models. These macroeco-
nomic models relate to the investment and saving
relationship (I-S function) and liquidity preference
and money supply and relationship (LM function)
to the level of aggregate demand and output in an
economy.62,63
In IS-LMmodels, a rise in the rate of interest can
be associated with a rise or a fall in the level of in-
vestment and gross domestic product (GDP) and
the same is true of a fall in the rate of interest.61,62
For example, if the LM curve shifts to the left with
IS curve unchanged, the rate of interest rises and
the levels of investment and of GDP fall. Should the
IS curve move to the right with the LM curve un-
changed, once again the rate of interest rises but this
time, the level of investment and ofGDPgoup. Sim-
ilarly, a decrease in the rate of interest may be asso-
ciated with a decline in the levels of investment and
of GDP or with an increase in these depending on
how the change is generated. Thus, if in amacroeco-
nomic setting, increases in investment and GDP are
associated, on the whole, with a higher rate of bio-
diversity loss (as is likely), there is no regular associ-
ation between changes in the rate of interest and the
rate of biodiversity loss. Unless sufficiently offset by
the adoption of technologies more favorable to the
environment, rising levels of GDP (either due to in-
creased economic production and consumption per
head or higher levels of population) can be expected
to reduce the availability of natural capital, includ-
ing the extent of biodiversity in unmanaged ecosys-
tems.60,64–66 In addition, the extent of human devel-
oped biodiversity inmanaged ecosystems is liable to
decline.37
Furthermore, there is evidence from the eco-
nomic literature on behavioral economics that in-
dividuals do not use a constant rate of discount to
estimate the present value of future benefits but use
a discount rate that declines in a hyperbolic fashion
as a function of the length of time until the benefits
will become available to the individuals.66,67 This
means that their present values of distant benefits
and costs are higher than estimated by the tradi-
tional economic method of discounting. Whether
that will favor greater biodiversity conservation is
unclear, but it may do so. However, the reasons for
hyperbolic discounting by individuals needs more
investigation in order to determinewhether itwould
be socially rational to adopt a similar procedure
for social discounting. We must face the possibility
that some observed behaviors are not rational even
though they occur frequently.
Intergenerational equity, sustainable
development, and biodiversity
conservation
The desirability, or otherwise, of conserving biodi-
versity has become an integral part of the debate
about the necessary requirements for achieving sus-
tainable development. While human actions reduc-
ing biodiversity now may benefit current genera-
tions (or nearby generations), they may disbenefit
generations further into the future. In fact, future
generations could be impoverished by such actions.
Nevertheless, the relationship between current bio-
diversity loss and the welfare of future generations
remains extremely uncertain and there is lack of
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Figure 4. An illustration of the possibility that some biodiver-
sity loss (change) could result in a higher level of well-being for
all generations compared to no biodiversity loss. This is so, de-
spite the welfare of some future generations declining compared
to that of their predecessors if some biodiversity loss occurs.
agreement on the ethical principles that should be
adopted to choose between the alternative possible
paths of human well-being that could prevail.
One view about a desirable path of sustainable de-
velopment is that it be such that the welfare per local
of each generation be not less than that of its pre-
decessor. Although there is not complete agreement
on how the welfare of future generations should
be measured, Pearce68 states that most economists
adopting the concept of sustainable development
suppose that it implies themaintenance of per capita
“utility” or “well-being,” which might be indicated
by nondeclining levels of per capita consumption
or of GDP. However, that is not a requirement of
Rawls’ principle of justice, which is often used to
provide an ethical underpinning to the desirability
of sustainable development.68 Rawls67 claims that
equality of income (well-being) of individuals is de-
sirable unless inequality benefits all. Theoretically,
it is possible that some types of biodiversity loss (or
change) could result in all generations being bet-
ter off than without such loss (change) but result in
some future generations being lesswell off than their
predecessors. For example, the alternative pathways
shown in Figure 4 may apply if tn is assumed to
be the end of the time horizon. Let pathway ABC
represent the well-being of successive generations in
the absence of biodiversity loss and let path ADE be
that with some biodiversity loss or change induced
by human actions. If Rawls’ principle of justice is
adopted, path ADE is the most desirable alternative
because it results in the well-being of every gen-
eration being greater than for the alternative path,
ABC. This is so even though after t1, each successive
generation has a lower level of well-being than its
predecessor. Thus, it can be concluded that a devel-
opment path ensuring that the per capita welfare of
each succeeding generation is not less than its prede-
cessor (which some economists believe is a desirable
feature of sustainable development) is not necessar-
ily socially optimal. This was initially pointed out
by Beckerman.69 This does not mean that the sus-
tainability of economic development (as discussed,
e.g., by Daly70 and Costanza71) is unimportant but
it does highlight the complexities involved.
It is also conceivable that some biodiversity loss
(or change) could result in the welfare of some fu-
ture generations falling below that which could pre-
vail in the absence of biodiversity loss or is only a
slight loss in biodiversity. For example, the situation
illustrated in Figure 5 is possible. There the path
ABC represents the path of well-being in the ab-
sence of biodiversity loss and curve ADEF indicates
that when some biodiversity loss or change occurs.
In this case, generations coming after t2 are worse
off when some biodiversity loss or change occurs
compared to a situation in which there is no biodi-
versity loss. Therefore, if Rawls’ principle of justice
is adopted, the path with no biodiversity loss would
be preferred to that with some biodiversity loss or
change. However, alternative normative criteria to
that ofRawls67 can result inpathADEFbeing chosen
as socially superior to ABC. I suggest that rational
individuals are unlikely to adopt Rawls’ principle of
justice.
For example, if all individuals could consult prior
to their being born and assuming similar conditions
to Rawls,67 theymight agree to the adoption of a de-
velopment path that maximizes their expected well-
being subject to their well-being not falling below an
acceptable level.72 If the acceptable minimum level
of well-being for any generation is U0, the develop-
ment path ADEF corresponding to some biodiver-
sity loss or changemight satisfy this safety-first rule,
as was discussed by Tisdell.73
In the hypothetical situation envisaged by
Rawls,67 the optimal development path depends on
howyet-to-be-born individuals estimate their prob-
ability of being born at any future possible point
in time. One possibility is that they could adopt
Laplace’s rule of insufficient reason, namely that
in the case of completely uncertain events, each
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Figure 5. Illustration of a case in which the option of biodiver-
sity loss (or change) does not satisfy Rawls’ principle of justice
but is socially superior for an alternative social norm based on
a safety-first principle.
possible event shouldbeassumed tobeequallyprob-
able. On this basis, the yet-to-be-born may assume
that the probability of their being born at any pos-
sible future point in time is equal for each possible
point. In that case, the expected value of the path
ADEF to the yet-to-be-born would exceed that of
path ABC because, from inspection, it can be seen
that the area of the set bounded by ABED exceeds
that of the set bounded by EFC. Therefore, path
ADEF, which hypothetically involves some biodi-
versity loss (or change) is socially superior to path
ABC, which hypothetically involves no biodiversity
loss or a minimal change in biodiversity. This is so
because it maximizes the expected well-being of fu-
ture generations and at the same time, ensures that
the well-being of no generation falls below an ac-
ceptable standard.
But given the same conditions, if the acceptable
level of well-being for every generation exceeds U1
but is less than AO, it does not. In that case, the
path ABC, which hypothetically occurs if there is no
biodiversity loss, is superior.
Although it does not negate the conclusions
drawn above, it should be kept in mind that the
estimation of probabilities based on Laplace’s prin-
ciple of insufficient reason is sensitive to the way in
which possible events are envisaged. For example,
the yet-to-be-born may assume that their probabil-
ity of being born into a future generation is equal
to the proportion of the future population to be
born into that generation. Therefore, in this case
the expected values of the development paths are
sensitive to distribution (over time) of the future
population.However, in the very long term, levels of
future human population are uncertain. While rea-
sonably accurate projections for this century seem
to be possible, it is difficult to predict human popu-
lation levels for the end of this millennium.
Unfortunately, a major obstacle to applying the
above sustainability models is that the relation-
ships between sustainable development, human
well-being and biodiversity loss are not adequately
known. Therefore, analysis of this subject is still
speculative. For example, in theMillenniumEcosys-
tem Assessment6(p. 5), it is stated that substantial
human benefits have been obtained from many ac-
tions that have resulted in loss of biodiversity. This
raises several unanswered questions. To what extent
could further gains in human welfare be made as a
result of further loss of biodiversity and how persis-
tent are these gains likely to be?What types of loss of
biodiversity are likely to be compatible with gains in
human well-being and which are a major threat to
sustaining humanwell-being? For example, is loss of
genetic biodiversity in human managed ecosystems
a greater threat to sustaining human welfare than
is unmanaged ecosystems? What type of biodiver-
sity losses are likely to cause the well-being of future
generations to fall below acceptable levels? Progress
with policy prescriptions will be aided by research
that helps to answer such questions.
Despite the limitations of the above safety-first
model, it does raise some important policy is-
sues. For example, The Economics of Ecosystems
and Biodiversity: An Interim Report45 is incon-
clusive in its recommendations about whether the
economic benefits received by future generations
shouldbediscountedwhenvaluing alternative paths
of future economic benefit. Nevertheless, on equity
grounds, this report appears to favor a zero dis-
count rate and even suggests that a negative dis-
count rate might be justifiable (see pp. 30–31 of
this report). However, neither is satisfactory be-
cause the sum of future benefit or well-being val-
ues of all who will live, discounted or not, is
not a satisfactory indicator of the optimality or
otherwise of alternative benefit paths. The nature
of the paths themselves needs to be compared.
For example, the intergenerational path ADEF in
Figure 5 gives a higher value than path ABC when a
zero discount rate is applied. However, if the mini-
mum acceptable level of benefit (well-being) for any
future generationmust exceed U1 (e.g., is OA), then
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path ABC is preferable to path ADEF even though
its present undiscounted value is less than that for
ADEF. This could still be the case if a small enough
negative rate of discount were applied. This matter
was raised by Tisdell40 in relation to the introduc-
tion of genetically modified organisms (GMOs).
The above development models assume perfect
knowledge of changes in biodiversity and the well-
being of humans. Even in these cases, social choice is
complicated.Uncertainty about these variables adds
to this complexity. For example, the development
and use of GMOs can alter biodiversity in uncertain
ways. Furthermore, the development of a GMOor a
new organism by humansmay lead to an expanding
but uncertain range of subsequent development of
organismsbyhumans, thereby further adding toun-
certainty about future states of biodiversity. Techno-
logical optimists are liable to see these developments
as a way of continually raising human well-being
whereas technological pessimists are afraid they will
end in biological and economic disaster. Irreducible
risks and uncertainties exist about the consequences
of human manipulation of biodiversity. This seems
to be an inescapable source of social conflict be-
cause attitudes of individuals to the bearing of risk
and uncertainty vary considerably.
Conclusion
Several core issues of relevance for social decision
making about biodiversity conservation have been
outlined. This review indicates that since the 1930s,
considerable progress has been made in extending
the coverage of the economics valuation of environ-
mental conservation, including biodiversity conser-
vation, and in developing techniques to measure
these economic values. Liu et al.74 have reviewed
these techniques as a means for valuing ecosystem
services and argue that they are useful decision aids.
This is undoubtedly so, but it is also necessary to
keep in mind their limitations, some of which have
only been discovered in recent times. It is clear that
economic valuation is only a partial contribution to
valuing biodiversity, albeit an important one. For
example, in view of other values, it was pointed
out that multicriteria analysis is needed to sup-
plement mainstream economic valuation. For ex-
ample, some of the available economic evaluation
techniques have significant shortcomings. For ex-
ample, reliance on stated human preferences to de-
termine alternative biodiversity choices was shown
to have several limitations. These call for care using
such techniques. For instance, social conditioning
and knowledge variations influence the attitudes of
individuals toward the conservation of different or-
ganisms and components of biodiversity. Further-
more, social values alter with the passage of time
and “biases” occur in stated human preferences for
the survival of species, as is indicated by the simi-
larity principle. An additional problem is that hu-
man preferences are sensitive to the provision of
information, which, given the bounded rationality
of individuals, has to be selective. Therefore, the ob-
server effect is likely to be important, and a source
of uncertainty in evaluation.
The presence of uncertainty due to ecological and
economic complexity creates major problems for
the evaluation of choices about biodiversity conser-
vation. Consequently, it has been suggested that it is
rational to adopt a precautionary approach to bio-
diversity loss. However, conservation of biodiversity
is not always favored by a precautionary approach
to decision making.
As is well known, market failures of various kinds
can contribute to biodiversity loss. However, it also
appears to be the case that the extension of mar-
kets and globalization generate processes that play
major roles in hastening biodiversity loss. Some
of the mechanisms that cause this to happen have
been identified. Furthermore, the structure of eco-
nomic systems globally make it very difficult to
moderate economic growth that erodes the stock of
biodiversity.75
Someeconomic literature suggests that rises in the
rate of interest are likely to hasten biodiversity loss.
While this can happen in particular circumstances,
it is by no means always true. There is no simple
relationship between changes in the level of interest
and the rate of biodiversity loss, as evidenced both
by microeconomic and macroeconomic analysis.
Loss of existing biodiversity tends to reduce the
natural capital of society, for example, the loss of
genetic material in the wild. In the case of biodi-
versity loss in domesticated livestock and cultivated
crops, human-created capital is reduced. Both these
sources of biodiversity loss can threaten sustain-
able development. Some such losses may benefit
existing generations but be a disbenefit to future
generations. As was illustrated, difficult intergen-
erational equity choices can emerge as a result of
this. These are compounded by uncertainty about
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development paths that may emerge from alter-
ations in biodiversity. For example, the impact of the
development anduse ofGMOson existing biodiver-
sity is often uncertain and so are the long-run con-
sequences of these developments. For example, the
development of one GMO may expand options for
developing others but these developments may be
fairly unpredictable and its impact on other species
may remain uncertain. While optimists are likely to
have a very favorable view of likely outcomes, pes-
simists (realists?) worry about the possible results
and their consequences for biodiversity and human
welfare.
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